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Abstract 
Political theorists have developed and refined the concept of culture through much critical 
discussion with anthropology. This article will deepen this engagement by claiming that 
political theory has glossed over a crucial aspect of the role of the concept of culture, 
rather than defined it incorrectly. It will be argued that culture represents one way of 
accounting for the variety of human groups by drawing on the recent Ôontological turnÕ 
in anthropology. This rests on an understanding of ontology
 
as a system of classifying 
entities anterior to social relations rather than a philosophical position. The article will 
argue against cultureÕs status as a neutral and universal method of understanding human 
diversity by situating it within a pluralist approach to ontology, that posits multiple 
ontological schemas which form different social systems, each with their own 
understanding of human difference. Through an investigation of the implicit ontological 
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commitments of multiculturalism it will be claimed claim that all political positions rest 
on a set of ontological presuppositions, and that these classifications place restrictions on 
the politics that they can express. Thus, political theorists should be vigilant of implicit 
ontological biases, represented here by culture, if they are to positively accommodate 
human difference. 
 
Key words; Culture; Multiculturalism; Political Ontology; Anthropology; Ontological 
Turn; Philippe Descola; Eduardo Viveiros de Castro.
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The limits of culture in political theory: A critique of multiculturalism from the 
perspective of anthropologyÕs ontological turn 
 
Political theorists have developed and refined the concept of culture through much critical 
discussion with anthropology. Debates within political theory and with this 
anthropological exterior have largely been focused on the essentialising character of the 
concept of culture used by political theorists of a liberal multiculturalist persuasion.
i
 
Rather than intervene in this struggle over definition, this article will claim that political 
theory has glossed over a crucial aspect of the role of the concept of culture, rather than 
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defined it incorrectly. It will be argued that cultureÕs role in understanding human 
difference is distinct to one particular way of accounting for the variety of human groups. 
By drawing on the recent Ôontological turnÕ in anthropology this claim will rest on the 
classification of culture as an essential part of the ontology of naturalism, where it is 
understood as a counterpart to nature.
 ii
 This will involve a reconsideration of the character 
of ontology drawn from the work of Philippe Descola, Bruno Latour, and Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro. For these thinkers ontology is not simply a philosophical position, 
but rather a system of classifying entities that is anterior to social relations. In 
understanding ontology as such, cultureÕs status as a neutral and universal method of 
understanding human diversity is challenged. Culture will be situated within a pluralist 
approach to ontology, where there are multiple ontological schemas that form different 
social systems, each with their own understanding of human difference.  
 
It will be claimed that political theory can be furthered by adopting the ontological 
pluralism that underlies this critique of the status of culture. The lesson that this article 
seeks to draw from anthropologyÕs ontological turn is that ontological presuppositions 
are unavoidable in political theory, and their biases must be unearthed if we are to pursue 
any pluralist political project that accommodates human differences. Multiculturalism 
will be taken as a case that demonstrates the relevance of this point for two reasons. First, 
multiculturalism has been the centre of debates regarding culture in the discipline. These 
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discussions, however, have focused mainly upon the character of culture rather than the 
status or role of the concept itself. Second, and more importantly, the ontological status 
of culture plays a pivotal role in establishing the politics of multiculturalism. Turning to 
anthropologyÕs ontological turn allows one to unearth the implicit ontological biases of 
multiculturalism, that differences between ÔculturesÕ are only conceivable on the basis of 
the prior ontological assumptions of naturalism. This shift to ontology will be seen to 
alter three questions fundamental to multiculturalism: what is the source of human 
difference? How is one to understand and study these differences? What are the political 
ramifications of this understanding of difference? By shifting the answer to these 
questions from culture to prior ontological systems of classification, it will be seen that 
multiculturalism, based within just one of these possible ontologies, is not adequate for 
understanding the diversity of other human collectives. In what follows, this critique of 
the implicit ontological presuppositions of multiculturalism will be used to show the 
reach of the consequences of the ontological turn in anthropology for political theorists: 
that all political positions rest on a set of ontological presuppositions, and that these 
classifications place restrictions on the politics that they can express. 
 
To begin, the concerns of the ontological turn in anthropology will be contextualised 
within several key moments in the history of anthropological theory, which will then be 
distinguished from those of the parallel turn to ontology within political theory. This brief 
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excursion will generate three questions that orient the concerns of the thinkers of the 
ontological turn, and which will be used to explore the ontological presuppositions of 
multiculturalism in the remainder of the article. How are differences between groups 
generated? How does one understand and study these differences? What form of politics 
does this understanding lead to? MulticulturalismÕs implicit ontological biases will be 
explored through a characterisation of its responses to these questions. After showing that 
these answers rest on the naturalist distinction between nature and culture, by way of a 
preamble to the concerns of the thinkers of the ontological turn it will be shown how 
culture has been critiqued from within political theory. This will allow the distinct 
contribution of the ontological turn in anthropology to be specified in terms of its different 
responses to the above three questions, in a manner critical towards those given by the 
multiculturalist. This will focus on ontological classifications as the source of difference 
rather than culture, that a comparative ontology reveals there is no neutral standpoint from 
which these differences can be understood, and that any political response to differences 
between human groups must not take its conceptual references points for granted. In 
conclusion the critical limitations of this work will be discussed in the context of the 
lessons political theory may learn from the position of ontological pluralism. 
 
Contextualising the Claims of AnthropologyÕs Turn to Ontology 
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An all encompassing account of the significance of the ontological turn is beyond our 
purposes, but it is instructive to situate it as a response to several moments in 
anthropological theoryÕs history. The first is the development of the cultural-personality 
school of anthropology which rejected early understandings of culture as a single, linear 
progression. Franz Boas argued that the reduction of culture to a single process of 
evolution was misguided, and that anthropology should analyse the variety of cultures 
and how they shape individual behavior (Boas, 1932: 613). Propagated by students of 
Boas such as Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, this led to the now common view that 
culture shapes individual personality traits rather than biology, and thus that culture is 
central to explaining the differences between various human groups. While this 
understanding of culture underpins much social anthropology, it is not the only attempt 
to decode human variation. In particular, the cultural personality schoolÕs eschewal of 
physical and biological determinism in the realm of culture was challenged by materialist 
approaches to human behaviour. Pre-empted by British functionalismÕs integration of 
apparently irrational cultural practices such as witchcraft into ÔconsistentÕ logical systems 
(Evans-Pritchard, 1976: 222), some American anthropologists questioned the separation 
of such cultural consistency from material causes. These thinkers argued that cultural 
forms are not divorced from biological needs but are in fact various expressions of the 
need to fulfil them (Harris, 1979: 58). In contrast to the Boasian divorce of strict 
correlation between culture and material causes, cultural materialism sought to deepen 
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their relationship to the extent to which culture became subordinated to the natural needs 
it expressed. 
 
These two cases represent two opposing tendencies in anthropological theory: a focus on 
culture as the basis of anthropological investigation and an attempt to integrate culture 
within a system of natural needs. A third development that brings us closer to the concerns 
of the ontological turn challenges both of these assumptions. Post-modern anthropology 
highlighted how power, authorship, and the culture of anthropologists play an 
unavoidable role in shaping narratives of other cultures. Due to the situated nature of the 
ethnographer as investigator, these accounts would always be Ôinherently partialÑ
committed and incompleteÕ (Clifford and Marcus, 1986: 7). This single claim has 
ramifications for Boasian anthropology insofar as the possibility of a truly impartial 
account of cultural variation becomes impossible, and for cultural materialists insofar as 
the matching of cultural structures with natural needs understands behaviour from the 
subject position of the anthropologist. Post-modern critiques of anthropology, therefore, 
emphasise the way in which the very presence of the anthropologist destabilises the 
possibility of any neutrality in the understanding of cultures. 
 
This brief history of several key moments in anthropological theory provides enough 
detail to contextualise how the ontological turn responds to Boasian, cultural materialist, 
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and post-modern forms of anthropological inquiry. First, it seeks to revive the radicalism 
of Boasian anthropology in a move which also eradicates the basic premise of cultural 
materialism. By claiming that the possibility of the concept of culture rests on its 
opposition to nature within naturalism, thinkers of this turn question the universality of 
this binary by making naturalism one of a number of possible ontologies. Boasian 
anthropology is confronted insofar as culture cannot be seen to be universal, and cultural 
materialism is challenged in that natural needs cannot be seen to be the source of varied 
cultural solutions to their problems (Descola, 2012: 43). However, the Boasian project is 
radicalised insofar as cultural relativism is taken a step further into ontological pluralism. 
Naturalism, as the ground of the cultural understanding of human diversity, is made 
subject to comparison in the same way as the content of cultures. Central to the 
ontological turn, therefore, is Ôan attempt to force the prior backdrop of comparison back 
into the space of the comparable (Charbonnier, Salmon and Skafish, 2017: 5). Culture is 
rehabilitated, after its integration with materialism, but also situated within a more radical 
pluralist project than Boasian cultural relativism. 
 
Second, while the ontological turn shares similar concerns with its post-modern 
counterpart, it both deepens and rejects aspects of its challenge to the neutrality of the 
anthropologist. The question of how power and authorship frames anthropological 
narrative is furthered by asking how ontological perspectives define in advance what the 
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anthropologist perceives and what relations are deemed to be possible. At the same time, 
this challenges the framework of cultural situatedness that cloaked Ôthe liberal subject 
going incognitoÕ in post-modernism (Charbonnier, Salmon and Skafish, 2017: 6). Once 
the very basis of comparison itself becomes subject to comparison, the notion of being 
situated in a culture loses its neutral character. In DescolaÕs words: Ôthe project of 
understanding the relations that human beings establish between one another and with 
nonhumans cannot be based upon a cosmology and an ontology that are as closely bound 
as ours to one particular contextÕ (Descola, 2013: xviii). By pushing the focus on local 
influences upon ethnographic investigation a step deeper than cultural influence, the 
ontological turn challenges the neutrality of culture and its ability to deal with 
contemporary anthropological and political problems. Where the post-modern turn 
sought to politicise the tools of ethnography, the ontological turn pushes this even further 
by questioning the grounds of this politicisation. 
 
 
It is worth noting that this position draws on and furthers critiques of the concept of culture 
made by Roy Wagner and Marilyn Strathern (Descola, 2013: 81; Viveiros de Castro, 
2014: 45).
iii
 Wagner challenges culture as an analytical category in his understanding of 
symbolic activity as a process of constant re-invention. All instances of human thought 
and action actively partake in continually inventing the symbolic system in which they 
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take place. This applies to individual cultures, but also to the abstract notion of culture 
that the anthropologist works with. Not only is a culture constantly being invented by the 
peoples to whom it is attributed, it is invented both in the analytical re-constitution of the 
ethnographer, and invented in the abstract concept of culture used to organise various 
practices and symbols (Wagner, 1981: 10). Similarly, in her work on gender and gift 
relations in Melanesia, Strathern questions the applicability of the concept of ÔsocietyÕ to 
Melanesian life, arguing that the need to use particular categories to make sense of 
ethnographic data derives not from their representative efficacy regarding the groups 
being studied but from our own methodological needs and prejudices (Strathern, 1988: 3Ð
17). By shoehorning the practices and customs of those studied into concepts like 
ÔcultureÕ, ÔnatureÕ, and ÔsocietyÕ, anthropologists produce inaccurate descriptions of these 
peoples due to the absence of analogical concepts in their own logical lexicon. Utilising 
the distinction between nature and culture to understand the differences between human 
groups projects a certain conception of how these differences operate onto any 
understanding of these groups.  
 
The challenge Wagner and Strathern pose is that of overcoming the imposition of culture 
and nature upon the problems and lives of those being studied. For Descola, Latour and 
Viveiros de Castro this is not an epistemological but an ontological quandary. Naturalism 
and its division between nature and culture is taken to be just one way of forming these 
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problems in the terms of the ontological division it institutes. Of course, what Descola, 
Latour and Viveiros de Castro each have in mind when they refer to ontology here is 
different. Descola understands ontology as a form of Ôprepredicative experienceÕ 
(Descola, 2013: 115), Latour claims that it defines regional modes of existence and their 
distinct understandings of truth (Latour, 2013: 147), while Viveiros de Castro regards it 
as a way of establishing ÔpartitionsÕ between various entities and relations (Viveiros de 
Castro, 1998: 1). These varying positions all hold that ontology is less a purely 
philosophical position, and instead a mode of cognising and ordering entities that makes 
certain forms of social and political relations possible. A simple way to summarise this 
position is that each ontological mode of classification rests on different presuppositions 
as to what is given and what is non-given, or what is taken to be self-evident and what is 
the result of the agency of individuals (Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 53Ð4). Not only do the 
differences between groups derive from various ways of parsing the given and the non-
given, but each groupÕs understanding of these differences rests on the understanding of 
variation that stems from each ontological distribution. Hence the necessity of the central 
claim of the ontological turn: anthropology must take on a mode of analysis where one 
particular ontology does not hold sway over the others precisely because these ontologies 
vary, and that these lead to distinct understandings of what is possible in social life 
(Descola, 2017: 34). 
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This focus on variation is precisely what separates the ontological turn in anthropology 
from a parallel turn to ontology in political theory. The ÔubiquitousÕ (Bosteels, 2009: 235) 
character of this turn can be called into question, but it can be broadly characterised as a 
response to what Chantal Mouffe has articulated as a lack of engagement with the 
ontological by political theory (Mouffe, 2005: 9). The plurality of political categories is 
only possible because of a prior questioning of the stakes of being by humanity. What 
ontology in political theory tends towards, however, is grounding politics within a single 
ontology. While ontological investigation should not be jettisoned from the study of the 
political, ontology itself implies a context and principle of selection that forms the limits 
of the conception of politics produced by any ontological position (Oksala, 2012: 6Ð16). 
Political ontology relies heavily on ontological postulates to underpin its analysis, whereas 
the ontological turn in anthropology seeks to pluralise these ontological grounds. The 
Ônew materialistÕ variant of this turn in political theory highlights this difference clearly. 
Authors within this movement explicitly reject the binary between nature and culture as 
it obscures the hybrid relationships and entanglements between human and non-human 
entities and the distributed sense of agency formed within them. Summarising this work, 
Diana Coole refers to this as the formulation of a Ôflat ontologyÕ which supports the 
Ôontological rejection of philosophical dualismÕ (Coole, 2013: 454). It is the formulation 
of a replacement ontology that distinguishes the thinkers of the ontological turn in 
anthropology from new materialists insofar as the former do not replace naturalist 
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ontology with another philosophy more apt for thinking human agency. Instead, they seek 
to pluralise and understand the variety of ontological assumptions regarding the given and 
the non-given that prescribe relations within human groups. The binary between nature 
and culture must be relativised rather than replaced with another ontological position. 
 
This contrast highlights the importance which Descola, Latour and Viveiros de Castro 
attribute to the plural character of ontology. Their relationship to the history of 
anthropological theory gives rise to three questions that orient their work, which will now 
be addressed to multicultural theorists in order demonstrate their implicit reliance on 
naturalist ontological presuppositions. The first question is how are differences between 
human groups generated? The ontological turn raises this by challenging the emphasis 
upon culture given by Boasian anthropology and raising the possibility of ontological 
variation. Following this, the second question that arises is how one studies this form of 
variation? Cultural relativists and cultural materialists place emphasis on cultural traits 
and natural needs respectively, both acting as the ground for comparing different groups. 
In contrast, the thinkers of the ontological turn force us to reconsider this ground in the 
light of ontological pluralism, and suggest a method of ontological comparison. Lastly, 
the third question that arises with respect to the post-modern turn and the work of Strathern 
and Wagner is how these categories of comparison lead to particular political positions. 
While post-modernists focus on the politics of cultural differentiation, restricting 
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ethnographic influence on accounts of groups to cultural differences, the ontological 
turnÕs furthering of the work of Strathern and Wagner suggests that it is politically prudent 
to challenge culture as the basis of this comparison as it does not exist in the lexicon of all 
human groups, and thus acts as an imposition upon those groups self-determination. 
Ontology thus becomes an issue of political representation insofar as particular systems 
of thought are silenced by the apparent universality of culture. The discussion below will 
draw out the following consequence for political theory from these questions: all 
philosophical and political positions are possessed of implicit or explicit ontological 
biases that can be made the basis of comparative analysis. Crucially, for us this means 
that we should unearth how these biases shape our perception of the possible in politics if 
we are to pursue any pluralist political project. This is the position that will underpin our 
discussion of multiculturalism below. 
 
The Ontological Basis of Multiculturalism 
 
The analysis of multi-culturalism that follows will draw upon this relativisation of the 
concept of culture, characterising it through a set of implicit ontological biases regarding 
the given and the non-given. Defining these ontological assumptions as implicit is a 
crucial methodological stance for two reasons. First, because multiculturalist thinkers 
rarely make extensive use of the language of ontology to define their positions. It is 
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central, therefore, to adopt the wager of the ontological turn that all points of view are 
rooted in assumptions about the character of being. Second, these ontological 
commitments can only be made apparent through comparative analysis with other modes 
of thought, rather than through isolated analysis (Skafish, 2016: 66). It must be noted that 
we will be taking advantage of, rather than taking part in producing, the fruits of this 
comparative labour. The analysis of multiculturalism and its use of culture in what 
follows will draw on the characterisation of naturalism produced by this project of 
comparison. As such, what is important is not the explicit character of the individual 
arguments made by multiculturalist thinkers, but a general and implicit constellation of 
ideas that will be brought into focus by situating naturalism with respect to other 
ontological distributions of relations. While there is not space here for an all-
encompassing review of the diversity of views that characterise multiculturalism and the 
internal and external critiques it has been subject to, this is not our aim.
iv
 Instead, what 
will be presented is a general characterisation of how multiculturalism responds to the 
three questions posed above, in terms of specific ontological commitments.  
 
The first question is how are differences between groups generated? The basic answer is 
that humans are unique in that while they are natural beings, they possess the capacity for 
expressing cultural variations that determine how this biological substratum is actualised. 
Before it is considered in all its diversity, culture is a natural characteristic of human 
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existence. A simple form of this ontological claim can be found in the work of Bhiku 
Parekh: ÔHuman beings share a common nature, common conditions of existence, life 
experiences, predicament, and so on. They also, however, conceptualize and respond to 
these in quite different ways and give rise to different culturesÕ (Parekh, 2006: 123Ð24). 
Culture is listed here in the same capacity as the commonality of human nature and the 
conditions of human existence, a seemingly banal remark that integrates the capacity for 
culture within human nature. The natural form of the human is to be found in its capacity 
to express itself culturally. This basic ontological commitment can be fleshed out by 
exploring two variations that assert the same basic principle from opposing positions.  
 
The first can be seen in the work of Chandran Kukathas, who argues that the capacity for 
culture is rooted in an unchanging human nature: 
Difference is not essential but circumstantial; and when circumstances are 
similar, people will act and choose similarly, driven by the same motives 
which have marked human conduct over the millennia. And because culture 
and the particular historical forms that human life has taken are ephemeral, 
they are of no value in themselves. What matters is man, who creates culture, 
and whom culture serves (Kukathas, 2003: 42). 
In this view, an individualist conception of the subject takes priority over its cultural 
variations. Culture is prioritised only as a faculty of the individual subject; it is created 
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and manipulated by humanity, and ÔservesÕ it as a biological being, acting as the means to 
the end of individual autonomy.
v
 Contrastingly, the communitarian understanding of 
culture, most famously represented by the work of Charles Taylor, emphasises the power 
of culture to shape its natural, biological bedrock. Against ÔmonologicalÕ conceptions of 
human subjects, Taylor claims that the Ôcrucial feature of human life is its fundamentally 
dialogical character. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, 
and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of 
expressionÕ (Taylor, 1994: 32). TaylorÕs claim is the inverse of Kukathas: culture is not a 
faculty or capacity exercised by individual subjects, but a characteristic of human nature 
that makes it impossible to separate the formation of individuals from a cultural horizon 
of meaning. 
 
However, both thinkers belabour the same ontological point from opposing perspectives. 
By asserting the ephemerality of culture, Kukathas both negates and affirms it. On the one 
hand, he rejects the Ôsocial ontologyÕ of communitarianism that sees cultural traits as 
formative of individuals in favour of a liberal, individualist conception of the subject as 
severable from the cultural attachments peculiar to it (Kukathas, 2003: 210). This 
expresses a positive and explicit ontological commitment to a particular understanding of 
human nature which tends towards isolated individuals as the basis of human life. On the 
other hand, this simultaneously affirms the importance of culture in that it is integral to 
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the character of humanity, exercised by the natural capacities of individual subjects. 
TaylorÕs position inverts these moves. Where Kukathas negates the foundational role of 
community in identity, Taylor affirms it, and where Kukathas affirms the priority of the 
individual capable of expressing itself through culture, Taylor negates any priority of the 
individual over its dialogical relations. For both, culture is an essential ontological 
characteristic of humanity and distinguishes it from all other entities, either because it is 
a capacity exercised by the individual subject or a central part in forming these subjects. 
Whether we see culture as integral or superfluous to the formation of individual subjects, 
it is necessary for understanding differences between groups because of this connection 
to human nature. 
 
If the source of human variation is found in this capacity for culture, then the question that 
follows is how one understands and studies these differences. It is claimed that individual 
lives are given meaning within the boundaries of a specific culture, which forms, 
according to Ayelet Shachar, a Ônormative universe in which law and cultural narrative 
are inseparably relatedÕ (Shachar, 2001: 2). This has led to an emphasis on the context of 
values and principles as the basis of multicultural political theory, rather than a priori 
normative universals (Laegaard, 2015: 270). Building on the response to the first question, 
this focus on contextual variation Ð in which values, laws, and individual behaviours are 
sutured Ð assumes that culture is a neutral form through which the analysis of these 
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differences can take place. Crucially, the contexts that cultures provide are not 
homogenous units, identical over time (Kompridis, 2005). This Ôfaulty epistemologyÕ 
assumes that cultures are isolated wholes with clearly defined populations and narratives 
(Benhabib, 2002: 4). Instead, cultures are constantly evolving due to both the plurality of 
relations and narratives that connect those within them, and their interaction with other 
cultures external to this shifting interior (Song, 2007: 31Ð32). Multiculturalism demands 
that political theorists pay attention to the practices that produce these cultures in 
particular periods of time rather than reifying them as cultural wholes. This critique of 
cultural essentialism is close to the gesture of the post-modern turn in ethnography: culture 
is retained as the central unit of analysis, but it should be contextualised within the 
modifications made by individuals (Benhabib, 2002: 66). Analysis of the cultural 
production of human difference takes place in a case by case analysis of the constantly 
transforming cultural conditions of particular political claims. Cultures may be understood 
to be non-essentialised and constantly changing, but they remain the locus for the analysis 
of human groups. 
 
The third question asks how one shifts from this philosophical definition to political 
prescription. There is no single answer to this question, but debates revolve around the 
issue of cultural rights, and the recognition and toleration of cultural practices (Parekh, 
2006: 340Ð44). If we are to follow the ontological presuppositions alluded to above, then 
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these issues arise as a result of the condition of existing as a cultural being. The key 
political assumption is that culture is the vehicle for identifying differences that must be 
positively accommodated (Modood, 2013: 56). While the anti-essentialist approach to 
culture would suggest a weakening of this view, it enhances the strength of culture as way 
of orienting politics by retaining the need to focus on how demands are articulated through 
cultural practices. Multiculturalism focuses upon how political claims are formed from 
within the orbit of particular cultures. Hence, as Sarah Song suggests, Ô[t]he question is 
not whether cultures should be preserved on the basis of inherent features they possess 
but whether the particular claim made in the name of culture should be accommodatedÕ 
(Song, 2007: 39). What should be noted here is the retention of the concept of culture as 
a key political tool despite an acknowledgement of its weakness in capturing the fluid 
character of human relations, and thus a tacit acceptance of its ontological centrality. 
 
Implied in the above is that one of the major stumbling blocks for multiculturalism has 
been its basis in liberalism. It is a liberal political theory before it is a theory regarding 
the diversity of cultures, situated within the particular public spaces characteristic of 
liberal societies (Modood, 2013: 23) and organised by assumptions about what it means 
to be a subject (Butler, 2009: 31Ð2), neither of which can be assumed to be culturally 
neutral.
vi
 The insight being developed here is that it is not just liberal culture but the very 
notion of culture itself that is not value free. More fundamentally, the claim is that the 
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ontological commitment to culture as a natural characteristic of human nature is 
representative of the ontological frame of naturalism that distinguishes between cultural 
and natural beings. Having characterised multiculturalism in terms of its adherence to this 
fundamental ontological distinction, it is possible to see how differences between human 
groups can be explored in terms of a comparative analysis of ontologies. By shifting the 
focus from cultures to ontologies, it is possible to see how this comparative project can 
enrich political theoryÕs understanding of human difference. 
 
Re-thinking Culture through Ontological Pluralism 
 
Before exploring the alternative answers to the three questions which formed our 
presentation of multiculturalism using resources drawn from anthropology, it is worth 
noting two allied considerations of culture from political theory. The first is found in the 
work of Anne Phillips who criticises ÔstrongÕ notions of culture that impinge on individual 
autonomy (Phillips, 2007: 8Ð9).
 
PhillipsÕ criticism is intended to defend multiculturalism 
against the obscuring of individual choice by the notion of culture (Phillips, 2007: 12Ð
13). Instead of using the term culture, Phillips suggests developing an understanding of 
the relationship between coercion and choice that characterises the actions of individuals 
in such a way that does not assume a catch all answer (Phillips, 2007: 176Ð80).
vii
 The one 
size fits all position she rejects is that the locus of political negotiation needs to be 
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ÔcultureÕ, and that it would be pragmatic to find alternatives in order to bolster the efficacy 
of the politics of multiculturalism. Where Phillips takes issue with images of culture as 
strongly bounded entities which restrict individual choice, David Scott finds fault with 
the uncritical use of culture within liberalism that presents it as an ideologically neutral 
term without a specific disciplinary history (Scott, 2003: 97). Scott highlights that cultural 
relativism was a perspective honed within the context of Cold War antagonism, and as a 
result it partook in the project of Ômaking the world safe for differencesÕ in a way that 
Ôdepended upon the reinscription of a cultural hierarchy that assigned tacit priority to 
American valuesÕ (Scott, 2003: 110). Even within views that put culture forward as 
something which is constantly transformed, the acceptance of culture in the abstract as 
uncontested and detached from its conditions of emergence as a term of political 
discourse is a post-Cold War ideological victory as much as a conceptual discovery or 
advance.  
 
Taken together, these critiques pose an epistemological and a political concern; how can 
we come to know differentiation between groups in a manner not uncritically tied to one 
particular concept, and how can these alternatives produce forms of politics more 
desirable than those that we already have? These are central considerations of the 
ontological turn, but its proponents move us beyond their iteration in political theory 
insofar as they deploy them within a reconception of the ontological status of culture 
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itself. Thus, the advantage of the thinkers involved in the ontological turn is found in 
shifting the answers to the three question posed to multiculturalism above to a 
comparative ontological backdrop upon which various social and political relations can 
be understood. Our focus will be redirected from how different cultures articulate 
competing representations of the same objects within a single ontology, to how different 
ontological assumptions produce varying distributions of relations prior to the separation 
between cultural representations and natural objects (Henare, Holbraad and Wastell, 
2007: 10Ð12). By demonstrating how the anthropologists of the ontological turn respond 
to the three questions used to summarise the multicultural approach to human diversity, 
the general philosophical commitments of multiculturalism will be shown to be based in 
the naturalist categories of nature and culture. 
 
The first question posed to multiculturalism concerned the source of the difference 
between human groups. Rather than culture being the source of this variation, the authors 
of the ontological turn argue that this separation is an expression of one particular 
ontological organisation of the given and the non-given. These ontological assumptions 
about the character of entities and the relations humans can establish between them forms 
the limits of the thinkable in particular contexts, but also the basis of what social and 
political relations are possible. Descola provides a clear summary of this position:  
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Depending on what characteristics humans discern in existing beings, judging 
on the basis of their idea of the physical and spiritual properties of their own 
persons, continuities and discontinuities of varying proportions are 
established between the entities of the world, classifications based on identity 
and similarity come to seem self-evident, and frontiers emerge, consigning 
different categories of beings to separate regimes of existence (Descola, 2013: 
232). 
This categorisation expands the meaning of ontology beyond a mere philosophical 
position or argument, to a form of cognition anterior to conscious experience and social 
relations. Descola, Latour and Viveiros de Castro make this point in different ways, but 
for all three it means that naturalism, the ontology at the root of the binary between nature 
and culture, is merely one ontology among a plurality of others (Descola, 2013: 30Ð1; 
Latour, 2013: 21; Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 43). As such, the answer that multiculturalism 
provides to the question of the source of human diversity is in fact one particular 
expression of this plurality.  
 
Two complementary examples from Descola and Viveiros de Castro demonstrate the 
situated character of naturalism well. Descola develops a division between what he sees 
as four basic forms of ontological classification that provide the structural basis for 
distinguishing between entities: naturalism, animism, totemism and analogism (Descola, 
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2013: 240Ð44). He claims that the difference between them is found in the way in which 
they ascribe various forms of interiority and exteriority to entities. Of particular interest 
here is the relationship between naturalism and animism.
 viii
 Naturalism posits one form 
of exteriority, a single, homogenous material nature, and differentiated interior mental 
capacities, associating the mental capacity for cultural interaction with humans only. As 
seen above, multiculturalism rests on precisely this distinction, reducing the natural world 
to a single datum from which cultural variation occurs as a capacity of human nature. 
Contrastingly, animism inverts this distribution, and posits the existence of many different 
physicalities, or natures, which share a single form of interiority, or what is referred to as 
culture within naturalism. Crucially, within animist ontology humans share culture, or the 
capacity for social interaction, with non-human entities. The universality of naturalismÕs 
basic assumption, that humans are cultural beings situated within a single nature is 
inverted, and thus challenged, by the way in which animism distributes relations between 
physical and interior characteristics. 
 
Viveiros de CastroÕs work builds upon this contrast between naturalism and animism.
ix
 
He argues that the forms of animism he studied during his fieldwork with Amerindian 
communities, what he terms perspectivism, do not amount to an ÔanodyneÕ cultural 
difference but a radically different perspective on the distribution of given and non-given 
qualities (Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 62Ð3). For perspectivism what is given is not a set of 
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natural qualities understood in differing ways by various human cultures but a single 
culture that is taken as given, and differentiated across various, non-given bodily natures. 
Non-human entities partake in the same cultural conventions as humans and are 
understood to be persons, but the expression of this personhood is transformed by these 
various natures (Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 57). What distinguishes humans from other 
animals is the manner in which a single set of cultural objects (beer, ceremonial temples, 
blood) is actualised within different worlds. A common example given by Viveiros de 
Castro is the difference between humans and jaguars. Both drink manioc beer, but what 
the Jaguar understands as beer is perceived as blood by humans. What is at stake in this 
difference is not two competing linguistic representations of the same object, but a single 
human culture actualised in two competing ways from two different perspectives 
(Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 72). This is precisely why Jaguars are seen to be humans in a 
non-human form, for a perspective is not merely a representation of a single natural world 
in different ways but the embodiment of the same culture in many different natures. 
Hence, Jaguars only appear as humans to other Jaguars. Perspective is of extreme 
importance to Amerindian thought, therefore, because, in Viveiros de CastroÕs words: 
Ô[w]hat these persons see and thus are as personsÉconstitutes the very philosophical 
problem posed by and for indigenous thoughtÕ (Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 56). 
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Descola and Viveiros de CastroÕs aim is not to reify these particular ontological 
presuppositions, but to use them as a foil to make a claim about the naturalist 
presuppositions that underpin culture. If the form that human collectives take is 
determined by these ontological categorisations, then the variation between particular 
social systems cannot occur because of the construction of various cultural forms resting 
on a given, natural cultural capacity (Descola, 2013: 247). Rather, it is because of a prior 
division of entities that delineates what social relations it is possible to express within that 
particular ontology. Sociality is not so much a condition of being human as an attribute 
that is distributed among beings by particular ontological classifications. In DescolaÕs 
words: Ôsociality is not an explanation but, rather, what needs to be explainedÕ (Descola, 
2013: 248). Put otherwise, culture cannot exhaustively explain the sources of the 
difference between human groups, as it is a product of one of these ontological schemas, 
either within DescolaÕs table of ontologies or Viveiros de CastroÕs pluralisation of 
perspectives. Thus, the origin of human differences cannot be culture, but a variety of 
ontological schemas which make social relations possible. 
 
The multiculturalist response to this restatement of the first question would be that we 
then run into difficulties at the level of the second; how can one conceptualise the 
difference between groups on the basis of an approach that puts fundamentally different 
conceptions of the world first? Without a concept by which to organise these differences, 
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how can we begin to compare, assess and negotiate between them? A response can be 
found in a repositioning of the site of comparison from presuming a form of equivalence 
(culture), to producing a new form of equivalence that puts both positions under scrutiny 
(Descola, 2013: 282). Naturalism cannot understand other groups if it presumes that they 
organise the world according to the same distinction it makes between natural and cultural 
beings, as this neutralises the possibilities of other ontologies in advance. What is needed 
is an approach to comparison that does not take its starting point for granted. Before 
unpacking one potential alternative to cultural comparison, it is worth expanding on how 
this neutralising capacity of naturalism operates by subordinating cultural variation to a 
natural, given ground. Where above multiculturalism was seen to move towards a non-
essentialist and fluid conception of culture, the basis of this form of culture in naturalism 
enforces restraints upon the possible understandings of entities and social relations. 
 
How naturalism neutralises other ways of studying human differences can be summarised 
with three key traits drawn from across the three thinkers being discussed here. First, for 
Descola naturalism perpetuates itself through an appeal to objectivity and Ôspontaneous 
self-evidenceÕ (Descola, 2013: 199). Natural knowledge is distinguished from cultural 
knowledge in that it provides a neutral backdrop upon which the latter is founded. We 
might disagree as to the meaning of an object, or have different ways of representing it 
linguistically, but the object itself is not altered or exhausted by these debates. Second, 
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Latour emphasises that this recourse to natural objectivity leads to a de-potentialising of 
political pluralism (Latour, 1993: 97Ð100). In polemic and strategic language with 
regards to multiculturalism, he designates this as ÔmononaturalismÕ: the positing of a great 
outside which scientists and social scientists investigate, in order to return to society with 
insights into the correct organisation of political life (Latour, 2004: 245). Once 
investigated according to the rules of scientific objectivity, natural objects are seen as 
epistemically risk free and their construction by the researcher is obscured in order to 
assert a certainty regarding the relation between people and things. This appeal to nature 
attempts to rigorously define how it impinges upon human life Ôby resorting decisively to 
an incontestable transcendenceÕ (Latour, 2004: 38). This image of nature as the great 
outside that provides incontestable evidence is shared by both Descola and Viveiros de 
Castro, and marks a key critical battleground of the ontological turn (Viveiros de Castro, 
1998: 6; Descola, 2012: 22). 
 
The third trait is the insight that all human existence is the result of cultural variations 
within the limits of this single natural ground. For Latour, multiculturalism is the 
counterpart of a single image of the natural world (Latour, 2004: 48). According to this 
view, humanity is Ôa tiny portion of being [that] was detached as a fixed pointÕ from which 
the rules of variation within this realm could be deduced (Descola, 2013: 69).
 
Humans are 
capable of investigating nature, but on the basis of their non-natural, cultural variation 
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also being subject to investigation. The limits of both human physiology and cultural 
variation become the subject of analysis, as a particular form of nature capable of 
understanding nature at large (Descola, 2013: 63Ð88).
x
 Culture is shored up through its 
simultaneous continuity with, and separation from, nature. Not only is this the basis of the 
claim made with regard to multiculturalismÕs response to the first question posed above, 
but it also directly impacts the response to the second. If naturalism creates a division 
between non-given cultural differentiation that is integrated within a given nature that 
grounds it, then the only option for studying human variation is culture. Contrastingly, the 
ontological turn forces us to investigate how this division between nature and culture is in 
fact characteristic of one particular ontology rather than all understandings of human 
variation. 
 
What this description of naturalism demonstrates is that it is difficult to mount a critique 
of its categories that is not easily reducible to yet another representation of reality. Thus 
to respond fully to the second question Ð how one understands and studies these 
differences Ð in a way that sidesteps the multiculturalist assumption of representation 
requires formulating an alternative to the presupposition of culture as the only way of 
decoding equivalent representations of the same objects across different contexts. What 
must be given up is the presumption of Ôa diversity of partial, subjective representations 
bearing on an external nature, unitary and whole, that itself is indifferent to 
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representationÕ (Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 72). This naturalist division must be inserted 
within a comparative ÔontographyÕ that charts how different ontological presuppositions 
form different social relations and different understandings of the world (Holbraad, 
2009). One path that leads from this ontography, taken by Viveiros de Castro, puts 
emphasis upon the replacement of equivalence within the doctrine of representation with 
disjunction, or what he calls equivocation. The difference between equivalence and 
equivocation is that where the former seeks to reduce the difference between cultural 
representations to a single mediating term, the latter finds the possibility for the 
production of new concepts in the differences between two or more terms (Viveiros de 
Castro, 2016: 63). Rather than neutralising differing ontological perspectives by 
establishing equivalence through culture, what equivocation demands is a continual 
translation of concepts between diverging views that puts the terms of both up for 
transformation, rather than fitting one into the constraints of the other (Viveiros de Castro, 
2016: 64Ð5). Instead of responding to the question of how one studies differences by 
emphasising the applicability of culture, a comparative ontological project demands the 
reconsideration of how communication is established between varying ontological 
classifications. 
 
This means that the third question Ð what form of politics arises from this conception of 
human difference Ð cannot have a clearly defined answer. There can be no immediate 
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recourse to culture as the locus of political action precisely because this derives directly 
from the naturalist postulation of a transcendental human subject who would be the bearer 
of such privileges (Descola, 2013: 192). If ontological pluralism implores us to 
Ôdetermine what kind of a subject is produced by each mode of identificationÕ (Descola, 
2013: 282), then what political theory must take from this is that the categories by which 
one negotiates between difference must attempt to accommodate these gaps and ruptures 
between ontological schemas. This does not amount to throwing the baby out with the 
bath water. The thinkers of the ontological turn would not deny that culture can be useful 
for articulating political claims. Instead, their argument is that one particular ontology, 
naturalism, has become overbearing with regard to our attempt to conceptualise other 
ways of schematising the world, and as a result, politically impotent when seen as the 
only way to conceive of these differences. 
 
Criticisms and Consequences for Political Theory 
 
Viewed through this comparative approach to ontology, culture cannot be seen as neutral 
concept for understanding of the differences between human groups as it an expression 
of one particular ontological schema. Multiculturalism, as analysed above, provides a 
useful case for unpacking this claim precisely because it rests on three points that can be 
challenged from the perspective of ontological pluralism. First, the implicit assumption 
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that culture is a natural capacity of the human is in fact the product of one particular 
ontological characterisation of entities, demonstrated by the contrast between naturalism 
and animism and perspectivism. Second, whether it is seen as static or constantly 
changing and transforming, culture assumes the need to establish an equivalence between 
differing understandings of a neutral, natural world, whereas the ontological turn argues 
that this task is impossible, and that a comparative ontography should chart the 
differences in perspective produced by these ontological classifications. Third, where 
multiculturalism sees culture as a critical concept for the articulation of political claims, 
in the light of ontological pluralism this restricts claims to one particular understanding 
of the character of reality, and thus confines our understandings of what forms politics 
can take. 
  
To conclude with the ramifications of these three claims, a consideration of two criticisms 
made of this turn to ontology in anthropology can help clarify the contributions it can 
make to both multiculturalism and political theory more widely. The first criticism centres 
on the problem of essentialism. Translating ethnological data into fundamental structures, 
particularly in the work of Descola, runs the risk of reifying and essentialising the 
particularity of ontologies (Vigh and Sausdal, 2014; Aspers, 2015; Graeber, 2015). Critics 
of the ontological turn argue that this severely limits the possibility for transformation of 
the character of collectives across time, and repeats the colonial gesture of solidifying the 
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definition of indigeneity as fundamentally ÔotherÕ to ourselves (Todd, 2016). 
Consequently, the focus on ontology perpetuates the cloaking of cultural superiority 
within cultural relativism that it is meant to solve, by merely displacing the site at which 
this relativism persists. The second criticism is that by focusing upon the ontological 
classifications that are specific to particular collectives, the real conditions of political 
struggle are occluded (Bessire and Bond, 2014: 449). Rather than focusing on the real 
struggles of indigenous peoples, and the potential of these individuals as subjects caught 
within these processes, the concept of ontology forces a focus upon the cosmological 
import of their particular world. This is to the expense of engagement in and with the 
political and economic processes within which they are caught. Critique is deferred in 
favour of academic wrangling over what constitutes a world. 
 
These two critiques can be responded to in a manner which highlights the contributions 
which the ontological turn can make to political theory. The first focuses on the reification 
of otherness by restricting it to a limited set of essentialised ontological variants. What 
the thinkers of the ontological turn have been careful to do, however, is emphasise that 
the ontologies they study are not timeless, and only come into being in particular social 
systems (Descola, 2013: 403Ð4; Latour, 2013: 226; Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 197Ð98). 
While this claim requires a degree of instrumentalisation of particular ontologies to be 
made, this is done in order to posit a project of Ôontological self-determinationÕ by which 
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discussion between forms of existence can be based (Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 43). Thus 
the first key contribution at stake is a challenge to the multiculturalist presumption of the 
universality of naturalism as the basis of diversity. Positing the basis of social relations 
in differing ontological schemes, even if it involves reifying these worlds to some extent, 
highlights this dimension of difference beyond culture. Cultural variation is just one 
method of understanding the difference between the given and the non-given, and our 
understandings of human diversity must go beyond the multicultural model of 
representing difference exclusively in terms of these cultural representations.  
 
The second criticism cannot miss its target, to a certain extent, when remaining within 
the ontological perspective of naturalism where theoretical enterprises are engaged within 
a process of abstraction from the ÔrealÕ conditions of individuals.
xi
 Because of this 
ontological situatedness this criticism loses any veracity as a specific point about the 
ontological turn, and becomes one about the status of theory in relation to politics in 
general. To what extent is any theory, within the naturalist assumption of representation, 
not at a degree of abstraction from what it attempts to think? This is precisely why the 
thinkers of the ontological turn attempt to do away with representation, in order to think 
anthropological, and political, categories on the terms of the other, rather than applying 
the pre-existing category of competing cultural representations within a single reality. 
This does not eliminate the nub of the critique, and it cannot be denied that this theoretical 
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enterprise is at a remove from the political struggles of those under ethnographic or 
anthropological investigation. Nevertheless, it is pursued in the name of those in question, 
and grants a form of Ôintellectual authorityÉto peoples whose proper names are usually 
not even known, let alone imagined to be synonymous with theoretical ideasÕ (Skafish, 
2016: 73). In this light, the second contribution that the ontological turn in anthropology 
can make to political theory, beyond a critique of multiculturalismÕs basis in naturalism, 
is a consideration of how ontological presuppositions underpin all understandings of 
politics. Confrontations with other ways of schematising the world, and the forms of 
politics they lead to, should not be responded to with a reduction of these alter viewpoints 
to a single, apparently neutral position. Instead, these differences should be highlighted 
and negotiated between, using a comparative approach to ontology which draws out the 
often implicit character of ontological presuppositions, as demonstrated by 
multiculturalism. 
 
These are, on the face of it, two modest contributions. The first, found in the challenge to 
the universality of culture, is tempered with the claim that it should not be jettisoned for 
good by situating it within the second, where a comparative approach to ontology within 
political theory is suggested. The consequence of these contributions is much greater than 
it first appears, however. If we follow the comparative methodology to its full conclusion, 
then all political concepts, whether they are explicitly or implicitly ontological, reach 
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their limits when attempting to come to terms with conceptual systems that do not carve 
the world up into the same fundamental categories. For the ontological turn in 
anthropology, there is no neutral standpoint for this negotiation to take place. This should 
not be taken as a demand to abandon the principles of naturalism, but an invitation to 
participate in the continual reconstruction of political concepts with a fuller, and more 
inclusive approach to the ontologies through which collectives construct the world. The 
challenge that political theory should take from anthropologyÕs ontological turn, 
therefore, is not to circumvent and eliminate the differences between ontological 
perspectives, but to continually alter its conceptual commitments in a comparative 
approach to ontology that eliminates any neutral standpoint.  
 
i
 Throughout this article I refer to the concept of culture rather than the policy implications 
of multiculturalism. This is close to criticisms of essentialism within the form of culture 
deployed by political theory (Turner, 1993; Cowan, Dembour and Wilson, 2001; Cowan, 
2006) which have been taken up at various points by political theorists (Tully, 1995; 
Benhabib, 2002). 
ii
 For exemplary overviews of this turn, see the work of Pierre Charbonnier and Gildas 
Salmon (2014), Eduardo Kohn (2015) and the collection edited by Charbonnier, Salmon 
and Peter Skafish (2017). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




 Both pre-empted the concerns of the ontological turn using a different conceptual 
vocabulary (Henare, Holbraad and Wastell, 2007: 7Ð8). 
iv
 For summaries of historical and recent debates in multiculturalism, see the work of Ruth 
Abbey (2012), Tariq Modood (2013) and Phil Parvin (2009). 
v
 This privileging of the autonomy of the individual as the goal of multicultural policy is 
most clear in Will KymlickaÕs explicitly liberal variant of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 
2001: 53Ð5).!
vi
 Both in terms of the institutions that facilitate multiculturalism and the abstract notion 
of rights itself (Cowan, Dembour and Wilson, 2001: 11Ð13). 
vii
 Kwame Anthony Appiah makes a similar critique of culture within multiculturalism, 
claiming that the defense of culture is incompatible with the liberal principle of autonomy 
(Appiah, 2005: 114Ð154). 
viii
 For a detailed discussion of the table of ontologies, see the work of Marshall Sahlins 
(2014). 
ix
 DescolaÕs animism and Viveiros de CastroÕs perspectivism are not perfectly aligned, 
and they give respective versions of the difference between their views (Descola, 2013: 
139Ð143; Viveiros de Castro, 2014: 77Ð84) 
x
 Descola owes much here to Michel FoucaultÕs analysis of the twin emergence of the 
natural and the human sciences (Foucault, 2002: 344Ð46).!




 Descola is more susceptible to this critique due to his adoption of a structuralist method 
of taxonomy, as noted by both Latour and Viveiros de Castro (Latour, 2009; Viveiros de 
Castro, 2014: 78). Peter Skafish provides a measured consideration of both the criticism 
and the benefits of DescolaÕs taxonomic method (2016: 68Ð75). 
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